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1 Introduction
What caused the collapse of the personal saving rate in the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) (see Figure 1), from around 10 percent in the
1970￿ s to nearly zero at present? This paper considers the quantitative role of
the social security program in contributing to the declining personal saving rate.
The social security tax rate has risen about 50 percent over the same period of
time (see Figure 2). In the above quote, Vice Chairman Ferguson points out
that growth in the size of the social security program is widely believed to be
an important part of the explanation for the collapse in the personal saving
rate. The simple general equilibrium model used in this paper does not lend
any support to this popular hypothesis.
Figure 1. The U.S. NIPA Personal Saving Rate
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NOTE: From the National Income and Product Accounts.
2Figure 2. The U.S. OASI Social Security Tax Rate
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NOTE: OASI tax rate for self-employed individuals is the solid line, and the
dashed line is the combined employee-employer OASI rate. Disability and
medicare components are not included in these series (including these
additional components would make the growth even more pronounced).
This paper begins by constructing a personal saving rate that is compatible
with the one from the NIPA by carefully aggregating across both working-age
and retirement-age cohorts, while properly treating retirement account contri-
butions and distributions from both private and public pensions in the same
manner as in the NIPA. Factor prices are determined competitively, and aggre-
gate capital is the sum of household capital across and within many overlapping
generations of continuous-time permanent-income consumers. The variables
of the model are calibrated to match some of the salient features of the U.S.
macroeconomic data. The model successfully reproduces a personal saving rate,
capital-output ratio, real rate of return, and worker-to-retiree ratio that ￿t the
data well. To see the quantitative general equilibrium e⁄ect of social security on
personal saving, I compare competitive equilibria with di⁄erent rates of social
security taxation. The model predicts that a 50-percent increase in the social
security tax rate (just as in the U.S. over the last few decades) may be respon-
sible for only 1/2 of a percentage point of the decline in the personal saving
rate￿ the saving rate drops from 10 percent to 9.6 percent in the model. This
result is surprisingly persistent across a wide space of parameter values. Finally,
this paper shows that social security￿ s e⁄ect quadruples in a partial equilibrium
setting, thus demonstrating the potential importance of the general equilibrium
approach to this particular research question. However, a four-fold increase of
3an already very small number is of course still small relative to the overall drop
in the NIPA saving rate.
Given that social security may play only a minor role in the context of the
particular model used here, other possible explanations seem more likely: (i)
the aging U.S. population means that more people are drawing down existing
assets, (ii) large (realized or unrealized) capital gains in stock and housing
markets do not show up as personal income in the NIPA but they may trigger a
consumption boom, (iii) the risk-free interest rate has fallen steadily, (iv) credit
market innovations have brought easier access to borrowed money, and (v) the
rather novel explanation by Reis (2006) that a technology-driven reduction in
the cost of acquiring and processing information leads rational consumers to
choose shorter periods of inattention, which in turn weakens the precautionary
motive for saving. (For more on such alternative mechanisms, see Parker 1999,
Munnell, Golub-Sass, and Varani 2005, Marquis 2002, Lansing 2005, Garner
2006, Lusardi, Skinner, and Venti 2001, and Gale and Sabelhaus 1999). The
analysis that follows will intentionally abstract from these competing theories
in order to isolate the role of social security.
This paper builds on the progress of some other researchers who also study
the role of social security in the saving crisis. For example, Parker (1999) con-
siders the link between intergenerational transfers and the consumption boom.
The value added in the present study is due to a general equilibrium calibration
of a personal saving rate that is compatible with the one in the NIPA, and a
computation of the general equilibrium e⁄ect of social security on the personal
saving rate. Gokhale, Kotliko⁄, and Sabelhaus (1996) construct cohort data in
order to decompose changes in the U.S. national saving rate and they conclude
that much of the drop in national saving in the post-war era is due to increased
government transfers from the young to the old. However, their focus is on na-
tional saving rather than personal saving, and, as they put it, ￿personal saving
bears no necessary relationship to national saving,￿ so it is di¢ cult to know
whether their conclusions can be generalized to personal saving. In addition to
their focus on a di⁄erent aggregate, they also use di⁄erent modeling techniques
and this may also explain the di⁄erence in the results. While their study is
an impressive example of careful data construction and analysis, it is done in
partial equilibrium. On the other hand, the present paper is an attempt to use
a calibrated general equilibrium model to estimate the quantitative impact of
social security on personal saving. Finally, they focus on the period 1960-1990,
and I study the more recent period 1970-2005 which corresponds to the drop in
personal saving.
In sum, this paper is a general-equilibrium quantitative-theoretic investiga-
tion of the role of social security in contributing to the declining personal saving
rate. The calibrated model provides a decent ￿t with a few key features of
the U.S. economy and especially with the NIPA personal saving rate, and so it
may be a suitable instrument for studying this research question. And, even
though growth in social security taxation has been extreme in the U.S., the
model provides evidence that social security may not be responsible for much of
the collapse in NIPA personal saving. This result runs counter to some popular
4opinion.1 On the other hand, the model used here is very simple, and adding
more realistic complications￿ which are discussed in the concluding section of
the paper￿ could very well change the results. This paper should be interpreted
as one small part of a large research agenda that will attempt to understand
the e⁄ect of social security on NIPA personal saving in the context of calibrated
general equilibrium models.
2 A Simple, Dynamic Model of NIPA Personal
Saving
The model below is a simple variant of Bullard and Feigenbaum￿ s (2007) macro-
economic model. Both models feature overlapping generations of continuous-
time permanent-income consumers. The two models di⁄er mostly in application.
Bullard and Feigenbaum abstract from population growth and study the role
of leisure as a solution to the consumption-hump puzzle. Alternatively, I focus
on the growth e⁄ects since they are the key determinants of aggregate personal
saving, while abstracting from the household leisure choice. Mortality risk and
age-based productivity e⁄ects are also not examined here.
Moreover, the model used here is not new. It is nearly identical to the
model in Caliendo and Gahramanov (2008) except for a few accounting issues
relating to the treatment of NIPA income and saving. Hence, the contribution
of this paper rests on the application of the model to an important quantitative
question, rather than any fundamental contribution to modeling.
2.1 Partial Equilibrium
Calendar time is continuous and is indexed by t. All people enter the workforce
at birth and work for T years, and the lifespan is ￿ T years. At each instant a new
cohort is born and an old cohort dies. The size of each successive cohort grows
at rate n (and hence the total population grows at rate n), so that the size of a
cohort born at time ￿ is N(￿) = N(t)en(￿￿t), where N(t) is the size of the cohort
born at time t. Thus at any time t the number of workers is
R t
t￿T N(t)en(￿￿t)d￿,
and the number of retirees is
R t￿T
t￿ ￿ T N(t)en(￿￿t)d￿. Let R be the ratio of workers
to retirees, which is time invariant: R = (1 ￿ e￿nT)=(e￿nT ￿ e￿n ￿ T): These
demographic assumptions intentionally abstract from ￿lumpy￿age distributions
like the baby-boom phenomenon in order to isolate the pure role of growth in
social security.
A representative individual from cohort ￿ is born and starts work at time
￿; retires at ￿ + T, and then dies at ￿ + ￿ T. The agent takes the economy-wide
1This ￿nding may have useful policy implications, given that policy makers may opt to raise
social security taxes￿ either explicitly through an increase in the tax rate, or implicitly through
an increase in the age of full eligibility or an increase in the earnings cap￿ in response to
ongoing solvency concerns. While such action may have important consequences for household
welfare, this paper shows that the NIPA personal saving rate would not respond much.
5wage w(t) as given, and w(t) grows at a constant rate x according to the stable
competitive equilibrium that will be explained later. Every worker alive at time
t earns w(t), implying that younger cohorts have higher levels of lifetime wealth
or permanent income than older cohorts. The agent￿ s savings account, k(t;￿),
grows at the endogenously-determined risk-free real rate of return, r: Again, the
agent takes this as given, and it will be shown below that a constant rate of
return is a feature of the competitive equilibrium under consideration. Following
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007), agents purchase claims on capital by lending
directly to ￿rms, and they also enter into debt contracts with agents from other
cohorts; the rate of return is the same in both markets. Agents can also sell
their claims on the capital of ￿rms to agents from other cohorts. For example,
a retiree who wishes to consume more than his income (from claims on capital
plus social security bene￿ts), can liquidate his claims and consume the proceeds.
Likewise, a young agent who wants to spend more than he earns can borrow from
middle-age savers. Hence, aggregate household saving (total demand for capital
less demand for borrowed funds) ￿ ows to ￿rms and is converted to capital, and
￿rms then compensate households according to the productivity of that capital,
less the amount needed to cover depreciation. Because ￿rms use part of their
revenues to repair depreciated capital, the resale value of the agent￿ s claims
on capital always equals the value of the initial loan to the ￿rm. The model
abstracts from di⁄erential NIPA treatment of capital gains versus interest and
dividend income, because this is a competing explanation for the collapse in
personal saving.
The social security tax rate is ￿ and workers bear the full burden since labor
is supplied inelastically. Following Feldstein (1985), Feldstein (1987), Cremer,
De Donder, Maldonado, and Pestieau (2006), and many others, pay-as-you-go
social security bene￿ts per retiree at time t are b(t) = ￿w(t)R. Note that w(t)
and b(t) depend only on calendar time, and not on the birth date of the agent.
The environment is in￿ ation free.
The optimization problem is standard, and it follows Caliendo and Gahra-
manov (2008) exactly, up to equation (10). A given consumer solves the follow-
ing control problem2
max
￿+ ￿ T Z
￿
e￿￿(t￿￿)u(c(t;￿))dt (1)
subject to the laws of motion for the savings account,
dk(t;￿)
dt
= rk(t;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)w(t) ￿ c(t;￿) for t 2 [￿;￿ + T] (2)
2The assumption of life-cycle permanent-income consumers who are fully rational will
stack the cards in favor of ￿nding a role for social security in the saving crisis. Because these
consumers have perfect foresight, their personal saving should be the most responsive to a
larger social security program. This contrasts with say a Keynesian rule-of-thumb consumer
who saves from pre-tax wage income. Such a consumer would be completely unresponsive to
a larger social security program and would instead accumulate just as much capital as in a
world with a small social security program.
6dk(t;￿)
dt
= rk(t;￿) + b(t) ￿ c(t;￿) for t 2 [￿ + T;￿ + ￿ T] (3)
a pair of boundary conditions,
k(￿;￿) = 0 (4)
k(￿ + ￿ T;￿) = 0 (5)
the balanced budget requirement,
b(t) = ￿w(t)R (6)
and the age-structure of the population,
R = (1 ￿ e￿nT)=(e￿nT ￿ e￿n ￿ T) (7)
The period utility function is of the CRRA variety u(c(t;￿)) =
c(t;￿)
1￿￿
1￿￿ , and
the discount rate is ￿.
The Maximum Principle gives
cp(t;￿) = ￿w(￿)eg(t￿￿) (8)
where g ￿
r￿￿
￿ and ￿ is invariant to the birth and calendar dates
￿ ￿
8
<
:
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e(x￿r)T ￿ 1
￿
+ ￿R
h
e(x￿r) ￿ T ￿ e(x￿r)T
i
x ￿ r
9
=
;
er ￿ T(g ￿ r)
eg ￿ T ￿ er ￿ T
and the ￿p￿superscript stands for ￿permanent income.￿Note that the slope of
the permanent-income consumption rule (8) across the life-cycle depends on the
parameter g, and the level depends on the birth date of the agent; each consumer
has the same rate of change in consumption across the life cycle, but younger
consumers have pro￿les that are everywhere higher than older consumers due
to growth in the economy-wide wage. We now turn to a derivation of NIPA
personal saving.
Using k(￿;￿) = 0, it follows that the solution to (2) is
k(t;￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)w(￿)
x ￿ r
h
ex(t￿￿) ￿ er(t￿￿)
i
+
￿w(￿)
g ￿ r
h
er(t￿￿) ￿ eg(t￿￿)
i
(9)
for t 2 [￿;￿ +T]: Likewise, using k(￿ + ￿ T;￿) = 0, it follows that the solution to
(3) is
k(t;￿) =
￿w(￿)R
x ￿ r
h
ex(t￿￿) ￿ ex ￿ T+r(t￿￿￿ ￿ T)
i
￿
￿w(￿)
g ￿ r
h
eg(t￿￿) ￿ eg ￿ T+r(t￿￿￿ ￿ T)
i
(10)
for t 2 [￿ + T;￿ + ￿ T]:
7At time t; a worker with birth date ￿ has NIPA income equal to y1(t;￿) ￿
rk(t;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)w(t) where k(t;￿) comes from (9), and a given retiree at time
t with birth date ￿ has y2(t;￿) ￿ rk(t;￿) + b(t) where k(t;￿) comes from (10).
Hence, at time t total NIPA income for all persons, Y (t), can be found by
integrating across birth dates
Y (t) =
t Z
t￿T
N(t)en(￿￿t) [rk(t;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)w(t)]d￿
+
t￿T Z
t￿ ￿ T
N(t)en(￿￿t) [rk(t;￿) + b(t)]d￿ (11)
At time t; a worker with birth date ￿ saves s1(t;￿) ￿ y1(t;￿) ￿ cp(t;￿); and
a given retiree at time t with birth date ￿ saves s2(t;￿) ￿ y2(t;￿) ￿ cp(t;￿).
Hence, at time t the total ￿ ow of saving for all people, S(t), can be found by
integrating across birth dates
S(t) =
t Z
t￿T
N(t)en(￿￿t)s1(t;￿)d￿ +
t￿T Z
t￿ ￿ T
N(t)en(￿￿t)s2(t;￿)d￿ (12)
which can be rewritten as
S(t) = Y (t) ￿
t Z
t￿ ￿ T
N(t)en(￿￿t)cp(t;￿)d￿ (13)
which is clearly equal to the total ￿ ow of transitory income.
This measure of personal saving is consistent with the one in the NIPA be-
cause (i) both workers and retirees are included in the calculation, (ii) personal
income includes returns to private saving, but does not include withdrawals
from savings accounts during retirement, (iii) social security taxation is not
included as part of the personal income of workers while social security bene-
￿ts are included as part of personal income for retirees, and (iv) no distinction
is drawn between spending on durables and perishables. Notice that the NIPA
treat public and private pensions in the exactly opposite manner. Contributions
to private pensions are included as part of income while contributions to public
pensions are not. Likewise, distributions from public pensions are included as
part of income while distributions from private pensions are not.
It is worth mentioning that within this model the NIPA personal saving rate
can be positive only if there is growth in the economy (Modigliani 1986):
Proposition (Modigliani Stationary Equilibrium Concept). If growth
in the real wage is zero (x = 0) and the population is stable (n = 0), then no
matter what the rate of social security taxation, a zero NIPA personal saving
8rate is a feature of a rational expectations perfect-foresight equilibrium in which
all consumers are optimally prepared for retirement.
Proof. The proof is tedious but straightforward so the algebraic steps are
omitted. Evaluate (9), (10), (11), and (13) at x = 0 and n = 0, and then insert
(9), (10), and (11) into (13); after many manipulations the result is S(t) = 0:
Q.E.D.
Corollary. Even more generally, it can be shown that S(t) = 0 if x = ￿ n.
Hence, there are two sources within the model for a non-zero NIPA personal
saving rate: growth in the population and growth in real wages. Of course, a
zero personal saving rate does not imply that the stock of total savings is zero,
it instead implies that at any given time the saving of the young equals the
dissaving of the old.
2.2 General Equilibrium
We now turn to the general equilibrium determination of factor prices. The
analysis here follows Caliendo and Gahramanov (2008) almost exactly, up through
equation (15). Total income (which is not the same thing as total personal
income under NIPA accounting, Y ) is Y
0
(t) = K(t)￿[A(t)L(t)]1￿￿, where
K(t) =
R t
t￿ ￿ T N(t)en(￿￿t)k(t;￿)d￿ is the total stock of capital at time t, A(t)
is the stock of labor-augmenting technology (where _ A(t) = xA(t)), and L(t) = R t
t￿T N(t)en(￿￿t)d￿ is the total number of workers (where _ L(t) = nL(t)). Capi-
tal depreciates at rate ￿.
De￿nition (Stable Competitive Equilibrium). A stable competitive
equilibrium is characterized by:
(i) r(t) = @Y
0
(t)=@K(t) ￿ ￿ = ￿Y
0
(t)=K(t) ￿ ￿,
(ii) w(t) = @Y
0
(t)=@L(t) = (1 ￿ ￿)Y
0
(t)=L(t),
(iii) Y
0
(t) = [r(t) + ￿]K(t) + w(t)L(t);
(iv) _ r(t) = 0 and _ w(t) = xw(t);
(v) consumers follow a permanent-income rule cp(t;￿) = ￿w(￿)eg(t￿￿):
This economy has a stable competitive equilibrium (see Caliendo and Gahra-
manov 2008 for a simple proof of existence) and it can be found by solving
numerically the following implicit function of K(t)
K(t) =
Z t
t￿ ￿ T
N(t)en(￿￿t)k(t;￿)d￿
= z1(t)q1 + z1(t)q2 + z2(t)q3 + z2(t)q4
+z3(t)q5 + z3(t)q6 + z2(t)q7 + z2(t)q8 (14)
where
9z1(t) ￿
N(t)(1￿￿)w(t)
x￿r z2(t) ￿
N(t)w(t)￿
g￿r
z3(t) ￿
N(t)￿w(t)R
x￿r q1 ￿ 1￿e
￿nT
n
q2 ￿ 1￿e
(r￿x￿n)T
r￿x￿n q3 ￿ 1￿e
(r￿x￿n)T
x+n￿r
q4 ￿ 1￿e
(g￿x￿n)T
g￿x￿n q5 ￿ e
￿nT￿e
￿n ￿ T
n
q6 ￿ e
￿(x+n)T+x ￿ T+r(T￿ ￿ T)￿e
￿n ￿ T
r￿x￿n q7 ￿ e
￿(x+n)T+g ￿ T+r(T￿ ￿ T)￿e
(g￿x￿n) ￿ T
x+n￿r
q8 ￿ e
(g￿x￿n)T￿e
(g￿x￿n) ￿ T
g￿x￿n
(15)
Because r(t) and w(t) depend on K(t), (14) is an implicit function that fully
characterizes the equilibrium; this is a rather complicated non-linear function so
I will resort to computing the value of K(t) that solves (14) rather than deriving
a closed-form solution.
From (13) and (8), the NIPA measure of personal saving in this general
equilibrium competitive economy, at the stable equilibrium, is
S(t) = Y (t) +
N(t)￿w(t)
g ￿ x ￿ n
h
1 ￿ e(g￿x￿n) ￿ T
i
(16)
where Y (t) comes from (11), which can be rearranged and integrated to obtain
Y (t) = rK(t) + N(t)(1 ￿ ￿)w(t)q1 + N(t)b(t)q5 (17)
But the balanced budget constraint ensures
b(t) = ￿w(t)R = ￿w(t)
1 ￿ e￿nT
e￿nT ￿ e￿n ￿ T = ￿w(t)
q1
q5
(18)
hence
Y (t) = rK(t) + N(t)w(t)q1 = rK(t) + w(t)L(t) = Y
0
(t) ￿ ￿K(t) (19)
It can be shown that K(t) and Y
0
(t) both grow at rate x+n. Thus, Y (t) grows
at rate x+n; and with some straightforward manipulations it follows from (16)
that S(t) also grows at rate x + n. Hence, the saving rate is stationary in this
competitive, stable equilibrium and I will evaluate it at t = 0
s =
S(0)
Y (0)
(20)
3 Quantitative Analysis: The E⁄ect of Social
Security on Personal Saving
The goals of this section are to (i) calibrate the model to the U.S. economy in
the 1970￿ s when the personal saving rate was near 10 percent, (ii) check the ro-
bustness of the calibration, (iii) explore social security￿ s role in the saving crisis,
and (iv) show the potential importance of the general equilibrium approach.
103.1 Baseline Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
Individuals work for 40 years and live for another 15 years after retirement before
passing away and exiting the model (i.e., T = 40 and ￿ T = 55). This corresponds
to an agent who starts work at 25, retires at 65, and dies at 80 (which is the
average date of death in the U.S. over the past few decades, see Bullard and
Feigenbaum 2007). Because the individual supplies labor inelastically, he bears
the full burden of the social security tax, so I will set ￿ = 7% to re￿ ect the full
OASI rate (absent disability insurance and medicare) in the U.S. in the 1970￿ s
when the saving rate was around 10 percent.
Demographics and technology are normalized by N(0) = 1 and A(0) = 1.
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) and Feigenbaum (2007) use a value of 1.56
percent for real wage growth in their macrocalibrations, and I will do likewise
(x = 1:56%). The rate of population growth is set to n = 1% to re￿ ect recent
trends in the U.S. This value also conveniently produces a worker-to-retiree
ratio of 3.5 (the ratio of workers to retirees has taken an average value of about
3.5 over the last few decades and this ratio has also been very stable over that
period).3
Following convention, capital￿ s share is set to ￿ = 35%; and, loosely following
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) and Feigenbaum (2007), I use ￿ = 8% for the
rate of capital depreciation, which conforms with the literature. Finally, I set
￿ = 1, which follows convention and is also consistent with the balance of the
micro evidence (Attanasio 1999).
The household discount rate is the only other free parameter, and I will
choose it to try to match three targets:
￿ 3.5 percent for the real rate of return for the U.S. (following the recent
macroeconomic work in life-cycle consumption, see Gourinchas and Parker
2002, Bullard and Feigenbaum 2007, Feigenbaum 2007)
￿ 3.0 for the capital-output ratio (Gourinchas and Parker 2002, Bullard and
Feigenbaum 2007, Feigenbaum 2007)
￿ 10 percent for the NIPA personal saving rate (to re￿ ect the average level
during the 1970￿ s before the collapse).
The value ￿ = 2% is able to decently replicate these targets; the model
predicts a real rate of return equal to 3.79 percent, a capital-output ratio equal
to 3.0, and a personal saving rate equal to 10.0 percent. This parameter ￿ was
chosen according to:
￿ = argmin
￿2R+
(
X
i
!i
￿
￿i
c ￿ ￿i
t
￿i
t
￿2)
(21)
where i indexes the targets, ￿i
c and ￿i
t are the endogenous variables at the
calibrated and target values, respectively, and !i are the respective weights,
3See the 2006 OASDI Trustees Report.
11which I set to 1/3. (Rather than ￿xing ￿ = 1, I could leave this parameter
free too and calibrate the pair (￿;￿) to minimize the right size of (21), but the
ultimate result does not change in a material way).
With this ￿t to the data the model appears to be a suitable instrument, and
￿ = 2% is empirically reasonable and consistent with the literature as well. The
calibrations of Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) and Feigenbaum (2007) often
involve a discount rate that is anywhere from 1 to 3.5 percentage points below
the real rate of return, so there is a precedent in this literature for choosing a
below-market discount rate, and this is common in macroeconomic models in
general. Table 1 summarizes the baseline calibration.
Table 1. Baseline General Equilibrium Calibration:
The NIPA Personal Saving Rate
Parameter Symbol Value
Work life T 40
Life span ￿ T 55
Social security tax rate ￿ 7%
Size of cohort 0 N(0) 1
Technology A(0) 1
Technology growth rate x 1:56%
Population growth rate n 1%
Capital￿ s share ￿ 35%
Depreciation rate ￿ 8%
Curvature parameter ￿ 1
Discount rate ￿ 2%
Endogenous Variable Symbol Value Target
Real rate of return r 3.79% 3.5%
Capital/output ratio K(0)=Y
0
(0) 3.0 3.0
Personal saving rate s 10.0% 10.0%
One desirable feature of this model is that there exists a large, empirically
reasonable space for the unobservable preference parameters ￿ and ￿ that is
able to reproduce all three targets with reasonable accuracy and about as well
as the baseline choice of these parameters. Table 2a shows a series of alter-
native calibrations for these unobservables, while holding all other parameters
at baseline values. Each row is a separate steady-state calibration. It is clear
from this table that the accuracy of the baseline calibration is not particularly
sensitive to the choice of ￿ and ￿; there are a number of alternative ordered
pairs that can hit the data targets equally well. Actually, this result is not at all
surprising. Feigenbaum (2008) points out that combinations of ￿ and ￿ from a
given level curve of the Euler equation produce equivalent micro-level behavior
12and hence are consistent with a single equilibrium of the model (i.e., ￿ and ￿
are not separately identi￿ed). So, in fact, the results of Table 2a could look
even stronger if I had followed such a level curve, whereas instead I followed the
curve only approximately.
Likewise, on the production side there is a large space of ￿ and ￿ that is
also able to decently reproduce all three targets. Table 2b reports some of these
alternative calibrations and it is again clear that many other possible combi-
nations of these production parameters will work. The baseline calibration is
fairly robust to the utility-side parameters and the production-side parameters.
Table 2a. Alternative General Equilibrium Calibrations:
Sensitivity to Unobservable Parameters ￿ and ￿
Unobservables
￿ ￿
0.5% 1.8
1% 1.5
1.5% 1.2
2% 1.0
2.5% 0.7
3% 0.4
3.5% 0.2
Endogenous Variables
s K(0)=Y
0
(0) r
10.0% 3.0 3.73%
10.1% 3.0 3.69%
10.1% 3.0 3.66%
10.0% 3.0 3.79%
10.0% 3.0 3.75%
10.0% 3.0 3.72%
9.9% 3.0 3.86%
NOTE: All other parameters are ￿xed at baseline values.
Table 2b. Alternative General Equilibrium Calibrations:
Sensitivity to Production Parameters ￿ and ￿
Parameters
￿ ￿
25% 3.5%
27.5% 4.5%
30% 5.5%
32.5% 6.5%
35% 8%
37.5% 9%
40% 10.5%
Endogenous Variables
s K(0)=Y
0
(0) r
10.0% 3.4 3.79%
10.0% 3.3 3.79%
10.0% 3.2 3.81%
10.1% 3.1 3.83%
10.0% 3.0 3.79%
10.1% 2.9 3.84%
10.1% 2.8 3.83%
NOTE: All other parameters are ￿xed at baseline values.
3.2 Main Results: The Impact of Social Security Growth
Let￿ s return to the baseline calibration and focus on the question at hand: what
is the e⁄ect on personal saving of a large increase in the social security tax rate?
13Recomputing the model under the assumption ￿ = 10:6% for consistency with
the state of the world in which we presently live, while leaving other parameters
at baseline values, will produce the following alternative equilibrium: the real
interest rate is 4.14 percent, the capital-output ratio is 2.9, and the personal
saving rate is 9.6 percent. Hence, the model predicts that even a large change
in the social security tax rate would have a very modest e⁄ect on the NIPA
personal saving rate.
Why is this? How can this result be possible, given that we know from
both theory and empirical evidence that social security should reduce the level
of saving for retirement? The key, however, is to recognize that household
preparedness for retirement and NIPA personal saving are not at all the same
thing. The NIPA personal saving rate includes both workers and retirees in
the calculation. Workers generally have positive saving rates and retirees have
negative saving rates in the model economy. And the above proposition and
proof make it clear that growth in the population and growth in technology
are the salient factors that allow for a positive aggregate saving rate along a
balanced growth path. Basically, growth ensures that the positive saving rates
among the workers will dominate the negative saving rates among the retirees.
Apparently, almost everything else, including social security, is just a side show
in the model. True, growth in social security reduces the size of the aggregate
capital stock, but this does not necessarily translate into a signi￿cant reduction
in personal saving, at least not the way the government de￿nes personal saving
in the NIPA.
This result is very robust to the choice of the unobservable preference pa-
rameters. Let￿ s consider (￿;￿) ordered pairs from the closed rectangle ￿ 2
[1%;6%]; ￿ 2 [1;5]; in order to study a wide space of alternative values that
sometimes appear in the literature. The change in the saving rate resulting
from an increase in the social security tax rate from 7 percent to 10.6 percent
is most pronounced when ￿ is low and there is no clear relationship with ￿;
but the change in the saving rate is remarkably robust to such variation in
these unobservable preference parameters and never climbs much above 1/2 of
a percentage point. Table 3a reports these results.
It is also important to check the sensitivity of the baseline result to the degree
of growth in the economy. We know from the work of Modigliani (1986) and from
the proposition above that total personal saving in an economy full of life-cycle
permanent-income consumers will be zero if the population is stable and if there
is no technological advancement (the dissaving of the old will exactly o⁄set the
saving of the young). Hence, social security can only a⁄ect the personal saving
rate if there is growth in the economy. I consider (x;n) ordered pairs from the
closed rectangle x 2 [0:5%;2%]; n 2 [0:5%;2%]: As expected, the e⁄ect of a
change in the social security tax becomes more pronounced as x and n increase.
But even when x = n = 2% the change in the personal saving rate will still be
on the order of 1/2 of a percentage point. Table 3b reports these results.
14Table 3a. The General Equilibrium E⁄ect of a 50% Increase in Social
Security Taxation on the NIPA Personal Saving Rate:
Robustness to Unobservable Preference Parameters
￿
1 2 3 4 5
1% -0.4 points -0.6 points -0.6 points -0.6 points -0.4 points
2% -0.4 points -0.5 points -0.4 points -0.4 points -0.3 points
￿ 3% -0.3 points -0.3 points -0.4 points -0.4 points -0.3 points
4% -0.3 points -0.3 points -0.3 points -0.3 points -0.3 points
5% -0.2 points -0.3 points -0.2 points -0.3 points -0.2 points
6% -0.2 points -0.2 points -0.2 points -0.2 points -0.2 points
Table 3b. The General Equilibrium E⁄ect of a 50% Increase in Social
Security Taxation on the NIPA Personal Saving Rate:
Robustness to Population and Productivity Growth
n
0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
0.5% -0.1 points -0.3 points -0.4 points -0.4 points
x 1.0% -0.2 points -0.3 points -0.4 points -0.5 points
1.5% -0.3 points -0.4 points -0.4 points -0.6 points
2.0% -0.3 points -0.4 points -0.5 points -0.6 points
There doesn￿ t seem to be any reasonable parameterization in this model that
might support the thesis that social security has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on NIPA
personal saving, even if it causes pronounced distortions to micro-level saving
pro￿les. To drive this point home, consider the counterfactual case of a decrease
in the social security tax rate from 7 percent to zero, which would cause only a
slight increase in the saving rate from 10 percent to 10.9 percent in the general
equilibrium model. There just isn￿ t much action along this dimension in the
model, unless the general equilibrium feedback e⁄ects are ignored (see below).
3.3 A Digression: Impatience Among the Rising Genera-
tion?
A di⁄erent hypothesis that is common in the popular press is that the collapse
in personal saving could be the result of growing impatience among the rising
generation. Parker (1999) uses the Ramsey growth model to lend support to this
hypothesis. The usual argument goes something like this: life is full of stories
about young people wanting to enjoy right now the life style that their parents
15enjoy, perhaps failing to recognize that it took their parents many years of
hard work and prudent ￿nancial decision making in order to reach that point.
Likewise, the household debt-to-income ratio is at a record high in the U.S.
(Lansing 2005), and so is credit card debt. The present model can be used
to study this hypothesis. For example, recall that s = 10% in the baseline
calibration with ￿ = 2%; and, a separate steady state with say ￿ = 4% produces
s = 8:2%: This mechanism operates in the expected direction and seems to have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect, unlike the social security tax rate.
3.4 The Importance of the General Equilibrium Approach
To emphasize the potential importance of the general equilibrium approach, I
exogenously set factor prices at their baseline values (r = 3:79% and w(0) =
1:17). Holding factor prices at these values and setting all other parameters at
their baseline values from Table 1, an increase in the social security tax rate
from 7 percent to 10.6 percent will cause the personal saving rate to drop from
10.0 percent to 8.1 percent. Ignoring the general equilibrium e⁄ects will make
social security appear much more important in contributing to the declining
personal saving rate￿ in partial equilibrium it appears that about 20 percent of
the drop can be pinned on social security.
4 Summary of Findings and Direction for Fu-
ture Work
Growth in the social security tax rate from about 7 percent in the 1970￿ s and
early 1980￿ s to 10.6 percent today may be responsible for very little of the
collapse in the personal saving rate in the U.S. This result may be considered
signi￿cant because theory predicts that a massive increase in the size of the social
security program should produce a large negative e⁄ect on household saving for
retirement (e.g., Feldstein 1974)￿ indeed this is a feature of the present model
too. But household preparedness for retirement and NIPA personal saving are
not the same thing, despite the apparent trend in the popular press to treat
these two things as equal. In sum, even though social security has important
e⁄ects on wealth accumulation for retirement, there is no evidence in the general
equilibrium model studied here that social security has played an important role
in the recent collapse of the NIPA personal saving rate.
There are a number of areas in which this paper could be extended. First,
behavior at the micro level is de￿ned by the standard permanent-income rule.
This is a strong assumption. Many behavioral economists think the permanent-
income rule is more normative than positive, and so it would be interesting to
see how the results hold up under di⁄erent assumptions about the way people
behave. Perhaps a model that allowed for some behavioral defect such as hy-
perbolic preferences, short planning horizons, etc., would lead to a di⁄erent set
of quantitative results.
16Second, a much richer set of macro data targets could be studied. Perhaps
most importantly, aggregate life-cycle consumption is well-known to be hump-
shaped over the life cycle, with a peak near age 50. The aggregate consumption
pro￿le in the above model increases monotonically, which is the result of the
assumptions in the simple model without any behavioral defect and without
any uncertainty. Perhaps a richer model that is capable of hitting additional
important targets would also lead to di⁄erent conclusions about the role of social
security.
Third, this study only considers the e⁄ect of social security on personal sav-
ing by comparing steady state equilibria. To the extent that transition dynamics
are important for assessing the role of social security, the present paper would
provide an incomplete picture.
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